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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched in January 2005 to 
cap CO2 emissions from heavy industry in Europe. It is by far the largest ETS, 
covering 45% of Europe’s total CO2 emissions released from 11,500 
installations of the energy intensive sectors. Its major role in establishing a 
price for carbon has been an achievement of global significance, and the EU 
ETS is often noted as the most ambitious climate policy implemented to date. 
At the same time, the scheme faces important challenges that potentially 
undermine its environmental effectiveness and credible survival beyond 2012, 
of which addressing the issue of industrial competitiveness is one.  
 
Concern about loss of industrial competitiveness is one of the main obstacles 
to governments adopting stringent climate policies. It is feared that policies 
applied to domestic energy-intensive sectors facing competition from firms 
located in regions without climate policy could reduce their international 
competitiveness both in terms of loss of profitability and loss of market 
share.1
Although the stated aim of an emissions trading scheme is to cap industry’s 
emissions at minimum mitigation costs such that it affects its competitiveness 
the least, industrial competitiveness impact remains a contentious issue 
surrounding Europe’s unilateral implementation of the ETS. 2
  
The analytics of competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS - more specifically, 
the ability of the free-allocation approach to address competitiveness loss - 
has been explored from different perspectives in the literature. Principles of 
how in the short run, sectors within the EU ETS are likely to adjust price and 
output, have been set out by the work of The Carbon Trust (2004), The Carbon 
Trust (2005), Reinaud (2005), Smale et al. (2006) and McKinsey and Ecofys 
(2006). They have presented numerical results of how as a consequence, the 
participating industries on a sector scale are likely to be over-compensated by 
existing high proportions of allowances that are being allocated for free.  
 
These conclusions have been supported by studies of the power sector using 
both empirical and model simulation approaches. For example, the empirics 
relating to cost pass-through and wind-fall profits has been examined in 
depth in electricity pricing (Sijm, Bakker et al. 2005; Sijm, Chen et al. 2006; 
                                                 
1 As pointed out by Demailly and Quirion (2006), to distinguish and disentangle these two effects is 
vital to discussions, as is demonstrated throughout this paper. 
2 The economic rationale behind a cap and trade system, applied to a large number of installations 
belonging to heterogeneous sectors, is that the price of allowances acts to equate marginal costs of 
abatement across all sources. If the allowance price is higher than a source’s marginal costs of 
abatement, they will reduce their emissions in order to avoid the cost of purchasing an additional 
allowance, or in order to sell an additional allowance. 
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Sijm, Neuhoff et al. 2006). Sectoral analyses have estimated the impact of a 
CO2 price on both profits and output using detailed global sector simulation 
models (Quirion 2003; Hidalgo, Szabo et al. 2005; Demailly and Quirion 2006; 
Szabo, Hidalgo et al. 2006, Palmer et al., 2006). Emerging from the literature 
are also insights into the dynamics and tensions between two dimensions of 
competitiveness. That is, tensions between A) short-run profit maximisation 
that involves marginal cost pricing, CO2 cost pass-through and output 
restriction and B) maintaining market share in the long-run by pricing below 
marginal cost but above average cost.  
 
Although studies examining short-term competitiveness impacts of the EU 
ETS conclude that in general, sectors in aggregate will profit from the scheme 
by passing through CO2 costs to product prices and adjusting supply, they 
mask effects experienced on an individual firm or sectoral level and provide 
little insights into the distributional consequences of the scheme (McKinsey 
and Ecofys, 2006; Palmer et al., 2006).  
 
In contrast to modelling approaches that necessarily simplify, the objective of 
this paper is the opposite; here focuses upon the “real-world” features that 
differentiate impact of EU ETS within and across sectors including 
heterogeneity between countries, firms, production processes, and scope for 
abatement technologies. By examining sample sectors both within and 
outside the EU ETS, we present some general metrics and indicators to help 
judge the nature of potential impacts on price, potential profit or loss, and 
market share. Our analysis gives strong support for a sector-specific allocation 
to better address industrial competitiveness in the EU ETS.  
 
Our analysis makes some progress to answer key questions facing the 
development of the EU ETS: 
• Can general principles and indicators be extracted that may help 
understand the likely impact of the EU ETS on different sectors, both 
within and outside the EU ETS? 
• To what extent may the risk of perverse incentives in electricity (as 
studied by Neuhoff (2006)) apply to other key sectors in the EU ETS? 
• To what extent can insights relating to leakage from an exceptionally 
detailed study of cement (Demailly and Quirion 2006) be extrapolated to 
deepen understanding of the likely impacts of EU ETS on market share of 
other key energy-intensive EU ETS sectors?  
• How far can such results be generalised across companies, sectors and 
regions within Europe? 
• How significant may be mitigation options and what implications may 
this have for structural design over time? 
• How may these and other impacts evolve over time? 
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The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the wider 
literature on competitiveness issues of climate policy. In Section 3, we begin 
by providing a summary of the key factors that differentiate impacts of the 
EU ETS on industrial exposure, drawing upon the basic insights derived from 
Smale et al (2006) and McKinsey and Ecofys (2006), then extend this analysis 
to develop and apply indices to a wide range of sectors’ value at stake and 
marginal costs impacts. Section 4 relates the general principles extrapolated 
from the analyses in Section 3 to the issue of timing and considers how 
impacts on sectors evolve over time.  Section 5 then describes heterogeneous 
characteristics within sectors that differentiate EU ETS impacts. The final 
section offers conclusions. 
 
Throughout this paper, “short-run” refers to timescales up to five years, and 
“long-run” indicates a post 2012 timescale over which strategic decisions on 
allocation of new investment start to bear fruit.  
 
2. COMPETITIVENESS: BACKGROUND and LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The debate about industrial competitiveness impact of the EU ETS forms an 
important part of wider discussions on the spill-over effects from climate 
policy, that is, the effects of abatement measures taken in one country or a 
group of countries on sectors in other countries. In theory, the first order 
impacts on prices (change in profits) drives secondary industrial 
competitiveness impacts such as re-location in the longer term. Spillover 
effects explored in the literature also include carbon leakage 3  (Kuik and 
Gerlagh 2003), impact on energy prices (Barnett, Dessai et al. 2004; Pershing 
and Tudela 2004), and positive spillovers such as impacts on sustainable 
development (Kemfert 2002; Gundimeda 2004) and technology spillovers 
(Rosendahl 2004; Sijm, Kuik et al. 2004). 
 
The implication of international trade theory is that the imposition of a CO2 
constraint in one country reduces the cost-effectiveness and hence the 
competitiveness of its CO2 intensive sectors exposed to international trade. At 
the country level, competitiveness is maintained in the long-run as exchange 
rates adjust to compensate for the loss of competitiveness. However, it is 
misleading to discuss competitiveness on a country level because a household 
or transportation in one country does not ‘compete’ with their counterpart in 
another country, hence the concept of nationwide competitiveness is ill-
                                                 
3 Measured by the increase in CO2 emissions in outside countries where abatement actions are being 
undertaken. 
 4
defined in economics (Krugman 1994; Babiker, P. Criqui et al. 2003). Rather, 
competitiveness is a concept relevant at a firm or sector level. Implementation 
of a uniform CO2 emission price impacts sectoral competition, by reducing 
competitive advantage of CO2 intensive sectors, and shifting advantage to less 
CO2 intensive sectors. In addition, for a CO2 intensive sector producing 
internationally traded goods such as steel, firms that are subjected to high 
CO2 market prices may lose competitiveness, at the gain of firms in regions 
without CO2 mitigation policies.  
 
In general, little evidence is observed in the empirical literature to support the 
hypothesis that climate policy has yet had large adverse effects on 
competitiveness (IPCC 2001; Zhang and Baranzini 2004). In their survey of 
spillover effects and competitiveness, Sijm et al (2004) compares results of 
empirical studies on the issue of relocation energy-industries and finds no 
satisfactory explanation for the different outcomes between empirical studies. 
They conclude that if a relation between climate policy and relocation could 
exist, then it is statistically weak and insufficient for policy making. A 
statistical analysis carried out on four energy-intensive sectors in nine OECD 
countries by Baron and ECOEnergy (1997) estimate an average 3% increase in 
production costs from a CO2 tax of $100/tC, supporting these conclusions.    
  
Conclusions derived from modeling analysis are more diverse. The IPCC 
Third Assessment Report (IPCC 2001) reviews studies that use CGE models 
with exogenous technological change to estimate spillover effects (measured 
in the form of leakage rates) resulting from implementation of the first-period 
Kyoto commitments through uniform carbon taxes. It reports estimated 
leakage rates range from 5-20% (increase in CO2 emissions outside of Annex I 
divided by reductions in Annex I). Grubb et al (2002) argue that such models 
overstate costs because they do not account for global diffusion of induced 
technological change, which has been demonstrated to have central 
importance in relation to climate change by Grubler et al. (1999), Gritsevskyi 
and Nakicenovic (2000) and others. On the other extreme, much higher 
leakage rates were reported by Babiker (2005), using a global CGE model for 7 
regions, 7 goods and 3 industry with increasing returns to scale and strategic 
behaviour in energy-intensive industry. Depending on assumptions made, 
the model’s estimates range from 25% (with increasing returns) to over 100% 
leakage rates that imply large loss of competitiveness in the OECD region.  
 
Over recent years, reflecting the surging interest in industrial competitiveness 
among governments and industry stakeholders with the implementation of 
the EU ETS in Europe, a new body of competitiveness literature has emerged 
with focus on competitiveness in the context of an ETS (Quirion 2003; The 
Carbon Trust 2004; Hidalgo, Szabo et al. 2005; Reinaud 2005; The Carbon 
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Trust 2005; Demailly and Quirion 2006; Smale, M et al. 2006; Szabo, Hidalgo 
et al. 2006; McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006). These studies using sector simulation 
models of varying degrees of complexity consistently estimate that impact of 
EU ETS on global competitive distortions are low for all sectors. A literature 
review and discussions of EU ETS competitiveness in a wider context 
(macroeconomic impacts such as on employment) is provided Oberndofer et 
al (2006). Studies using detailed sectoral models (e.g. Quirion 2003, Demailly 
and Quirion 2006) have, in addition, provided insights into the way in which 
under profit-maximisation, allocation methodology affects competitive 
impacts. In addition, Johnston (2006) considers the legal implications of free-
allocation and profit-making.  
 
3. SUMMARY OF SECTORAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM EU ETS  
3.1 Key determinants of industrial exposure 
The three main factors determining a sector’s inherent potential exposure to 
the EU ETS are: i) energy intensity; ii) ability to pass cost increases through to 
prices; and iii) opportunity to abate carbon.  
 
Figure 1 shows a conceptual matrix, broadly classifying various sectors 
according to the likely impacts of the EU ETS, when measured in what are 
considered the two primary dimensions of competitive exposure: potential 
value at stake as indicated by energy intensity, and ability to pass cost 
changes through into prices. For sectors like ferrous metals that fall under the 
category ‘at risk’, high international exposure constrains their ability to pass 
on costs, even though they may not lose out in the short term. Although 
electricity is energy intensive, because of its high ability to pass on costs, this 
sector has high potential to gain from the EU ETS. As suggested by Demailly 
and Quirion (2006), whilst ‘inland’ cement manufactures protected by 
transport costs can similarly be considered as having the potential to gain, the 
same may not be true for coastal cement producers exposed to the threat of 
imports.4  
 
                                                 
4 The GEO trade model used in this study divides the world into over 7,000 areas, of which 1,600 areas 
are identified real sea harbours and more ‘land harbours’ are represented in order to compute realistic 
transportation costs. 
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Figure 1- Classification of industrial sectors according to exposure 
 
3.2 ‘Value at stake’ and marginal cost impacts 
To translate the general principles underlying Figure 1 into quantitative 
insights, in Figure 2 and 3 we develop and apply indices to a wide range of 
sectors, illustrated with reference to 2004 UK data.5   
 
The biggest single constraint on ability to pass CO2-related costs on to 
customers is foreign competition from regions outside the EU ETS region, and 
the simplest measure of this is the existing degree of trade intensity. This 
forms the x-axis in Figure 2 (see figure notes for definition). Obviously this is 
an imperfect indicator, and in response to large price differentials could 
change substantially over time; but it remains by far the most plausible 
aggregate indicator of the barriers to large scale imports and exports. The 
quite exceptional position of Aluminium, as noted in Smale (2006), is readily 
apparent – its trade intensity is almost twice that of any other sector. 
                                                 
5 Results for one sector in particular (pulp and paper) is highly unrepresentative from a European 
perspective - UK accounted for 6.1% total paper production and almost nont for total pulp production 
by country in CEPI (Confederation of European Paper Industry) in 2005 (CEPI, 2005). Germany, Sweden 
and Finland are the largest producers and together account for 46.1% of total paper production and 
62.8% of total pulp production. 
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Figure 2  - Net Value At Stake relative to UK trade intensity from outside the EU.6 
Notes: Upper end of range indicates zero free allocation, and lower end of range indicates 100% 
free allowances (effect of €10/MWh electricity price increase to sectors). Assumes allowance price 
of €15/tCO2 and no CO2 price pass through in sector. Trade intensity here is defined as the value 
of imports from non-EU countries as a proportion of the total supply in the UK minus the value of 
exports to non-EU countries as a proportion of total demand in the UK. 
 
The vertical axis combines the full range of potential indices of net value at 
stake (NVAS), which we define as the net impact of the EU ETS on sector costs 
relative to sector value-added. The lower end shows the impact if the sector 
participates in the EU ETS and receives free allocations equal to its “business-
as-usual” emissions, and takes no abatement action: the NVAS then 
represents the sector’s exposure to indirect costs through electricity price 
impacts only. The upper end shows the impact if there were no free 
allocations – equivalent to 100% purchase on markets or auctioning at the 
market price.  The chart shows results for a carbon price of 15€/t CO2 and an 
electricity pass-through resulting in wholesale electricity cost increase of 
€10/MWh. Scaling the electricity price would move the lower point of the bars 
                                                 
6 Own calculations based on following data Sources: Energy consumption data adapted from DTI 
Energy Statistics Publications “Table 4.6: Detailed industrial energy consumption, by fuel, 2004” 
available from http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/statistics/publications/energy-consumption/industrial-
tables/page18171.html. Trade and demand/supply data adapted from UK National Statistics’ United 
Kingdom Input-Output Analyses 2006 Edition available from 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/inputoutput/. Fuel inputs for electricity 
generation taken from DTI’s DUKES 5.1.1 available at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/statistics/source/electricity/page18527.html. Cement process emissions 
calculated as 0.45t CO2/t cement as with Cembureau (1999). 
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in direct proportion; scaling the carbon price would scale the height of each 
bar.  
 
The significance of the upper level (no free allocation) is that it also gives an 
indication of the impact on marginal cost of any fixed allocation. As long as 
production of more or less output is not accompanied by any change in free 
allowances, it faces the full cost of extra allowances, or the opportunity cost of 
not selling allowances. In addition, since in general firms maximise profits by 
pricing at or close to the marginal cost of last unit produced, the upper level 
gives a rough indication of the corresponding potential impact on output 
prices (relative to value-added). As emphasised in previous modelling studies, 
such behaviour will in general lead to large profit gains from the EU ETS – 
but at the expenses of a cost differential that could increasingly lead to loss of 
market share to foreign imports in the longer term.  
  
Sectors outside of the EU ETS would face the cost impact at the bottom of 
each bar (electricity price exposure) and an equivalent incentive to change the 
price of their products; there would be no divergence between average and 
marginal costs, and no resulting scope for profiting from such divergence. 7
 
The first striking feature of the graph is that Cement, Refining & Fuels, Iron 
and Steel and Non-ferrous metals (principally Aluminium) stand out for their 
high potential value-at-stake. The wide ranges for the former three reflect 
their high intensity of direct carbon emissions relative to electricity; the 
narrow bar for Aluminium reflects its dependence on electrical processes, that 
sometimes result in it being termed “solid electricity”. If sectors receive 100% 
free allocation, aluminium is not only twice as exposed in trade terms, but it 
faces the highest impact of all sector on net value at stake (3.7%) – its degree 
of exposure is wholly unique. 8  Profits in the Iron and Steel and Cement 
sectors are also relatively sensitive to electricity price, with 2.7% and 2.4% 
NVAS respectively. For Refining which uses hardly any electricity from the 
grid, 100% free allocation reduces its NVAS to barely 1.1% of its total value-
added.   
 
However, zero free allocation – or pricing at the marginal (opportunity) cost – 
gives a very different picture for these three sectors. Cement, with an NVAS 
                                                 
7 Note that this is a complementary treatment to that presented in the Carbon Trust analysis  (Carbon 
Trust, 2004) which focused on the variation in value at stake for a range of electricity price pass through 
and a modest range of allocation cutbacks (0-10%).  The intent in Figs 2 and 3 here is to give an insight 
also into the marginal cost impacts that can drive imports under profit-maximising behaviour. Also the 
chart in Carbon Trust (2004) was indexed on total sector turnover, rather than value-added. 
8 Electricity costs for aluminium production average a quarter of operating costs, with 95% of 
electricity used for smelting stage (equivalent to 80% of emissions of all primary production 
of aluminium). 
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impact of 16% of its total value-added then stands out. The equivalent NVAS 
impact on Refining & Fuels, and Iron & Steel, is about 6% each. For the UK, 
no other EU ETS sector in aggregate has NVAS impacts above 2% even for 
zero free allocation. High CO2 intensity per unit of profit may explain the high 
leakage rate associated with profit-maximisation in Demailly and Quirion 
(2006): differential simply become so large that barriers that traditionally hold 
foreign imports away and exports competitive are overcome over time. 
 
More explicit price indices are considered below. In Figure 3 we show the 
same NVAS range data for UK industrial sectors, but this is set against the 
import intensity from other EU countries. Although the EU ETS should have a 
similar impact on prices everywhere in Europe, in practice the degree of 
electricity cost impacts may vary and the sector structures and associated 
carbon intensities may differ between different countries as discussed in 
section 4.1 below.  
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Figure 3 Net Value At Stake relative to UK trade intensity from within the EU 
Notes: See Figure 2 notes for assumptions and data sources. Trade intensity here is defined as the 
value of imports from EU countries as a proportion of the total supply in the UK minus the value 
of exports to EU countries as a proportion of total demand in the UK. 
 
Moreover, the intensity of trade within Europe gives an insight into the 
potential degree of concern about differential allocations between countries. 
The most sensitive sectors from this standpoint, for UK companies, are Iron 
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and Steel, Refining and Fuels, and Cement. Chemicals and Aluminium again 
also shows high trade intensity, with sensitivity likely to be as much on 
electricity differences (for participating installations) as on allocation 
differentials.  
 
It is apparent from the static analysis here that differentials in level of 
exposure to international trade and net value at stake imply that potential 
competitiveness impacts are widely differentiated across sectors. Yet a 
common theme across allocation plans in Phase I and II of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme was the limited nature of differentiation between sectors. 
Many plans treated virtually all sectors the same, by allocating according to 
their expected ‘business-as-usual’ needs, with the result that some sectors 
(electricity) are over-compensated more than others. The implication in the 
longer term perspective is explored in the following section.  
 
4. OPTIONS FOR SECTOR-SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS OVER TIME  
4.1 A case for a sector-specific approach post-2012  
 
Separating the two distinct effects potentially experienced by companies 
provide the key to understanding competitiveness impacts over time: 
1. change in profits (from one-off gains in economic value from free-
allowances, and from short-term adjustments to output and product 
prices) 
2. change in market share  
Whilst most covered sectors have so far profited from the former, traded 
sectors are at the same time are faced with potential adverse impact on 
market share in the long-run due to leakage. Leakage results from two 
distinct effects: A) plant closures in Europe and B) additional capacity outside 
of Europe to service market growth. 
 
The magnitude and timing of market share loss will depend on various 
factors including the degree of production and price adjustments, degree of 
exposure to international trade and expectations about allocation cut-backs in 
the future. The extent to which a company is concerned about long-term 
market share loss may also reflect in pricing strategies exercised today – 
unlike power generation, traded sectors are likely to avoid aggressive 
marginal pricing strategies.  
 
To gain a sense of the dynamic impacts on the market, Table 1 below report 
results adapted from the Oxera (2005) analyses. Using a Cournot model of the 
impacts on net values at stake, and the percentage increase in product price 
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required to maintain profits for UK industrial sectors, for moderate ‘2010’ and 
more severe ‘2020’ scenarios.  
  
 
  Net value at stake (%of 
current EBITDA)* 
Product price rise 
required to keep profits 
flat (% of current price) 
2010** 2020** 2010** 2020**   
€15/5% €30/15% €15/5% €30/15% 
Cement 22% 55% 5% 9% 
Steel 11% 29% 1.5% 4% 
Newsprint 1% 3% <0.1% 0.6% EU
 E
TS
 
Se
ct
or
s 
Petroleum 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.3% 
Aluminium 60% 150% Unable to maintain 
current profits 
Car 
manufacture 
1% 3% <0.1% 0.1% 
Brewing 1% 2.5% <0.1% <0.1% 
Grocery 
Retail 
0.5% 1% <0.1% <0.1% N
on
-E
U
 E
TS
  
Se
ct
or
s 
Hotels 2% 5% 0.4% 0.5% 
Table 1 – EU ETS Sectors Net Value-at-Stake and price rise required to maintain 
profitability of key energy-intensive sectors under the most demanding scenarios. 
Notes:  *As in Section 3, NVAS is defined as increase in total costs after allowance allocation divided 
by original EBITDA.** EU ETS price are assumed to be 15 €/tCO2 and 30€/tCO2 for 2010 and 2020 
scenarios respectively.  In both Scenarios, allocation cut back is assumed at 1%pa from 2005, hence 5% 
cut-back for 2010, and 15% cut-back for 2020.  Includes both direct and indirect EU-ETS effects.  Also 
takes into account the overlap between the different instruments used to regulate emissions from these 
sectors i.e.  the UK Climate Change Levy and the UK Climate Change Agreement. CCL does not 
include revenue recycling. CCL is assumed to stay constant for both scenarios (in contrast to 2020 
scenario in Oxera (2005) which includes a doubling of CCL effect).  
Sources: Oxera (2005) and The Carbon Trust (2005).   
 
Under the scenario set out to 2010, the product price uplift required to 
maintain profits is relatively small for most EU ETS sectors, relative to other 
factors that determine competitive positions such as transport costs, price 
fluctuations and international differentials. However, this does not hold if 
stringency of climate policies increase in line with targets for emissions 
reductions over time. The price increase required for cement and to a lesser 
degree steel, become large under the more severe 2020 scenario at 9% and 4% 
respectively. This suggests severe limitations to free-allocation as an approach 
to protecting the competitiveness of these sectors, and the need for alternative 
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approaches. These results are consistent with leakage rates found under 
scenario using allocation by grandfathering, in the study using a detailed 
models of the EU cement sector taking account of transport costs (Demailly 
and Quirion 2006). 
 
For the non-EU ETS sectors, the results also confirm the conclusions of the 
analysis in Section 3, that the UK aluminium producers’ competitive position 
is severely at risk if reliant on electricity input from the national grid. For both 
measures, the impact on newsprint, petroleum, car manufacturing and 
brewing is extremely small. 
 
Thus the general application of free-allocation across all sectors represents a 
crude and near-term way to addresses competitiveness issue in the EU ETS. 
As stringency of climate policies are increased over time in line with targets 
for emissions reductions, distributional consequences too will become 
magnified. While most sectors, and particularly the power generation sector 
profits from it in the short-run, it does not offer solutions to problems in the 
long-run for sectors like iron & steel and cement, or sectors severely affected 
by indirect impacts of the EU ETS (in the form of raised electricity prices) such 
as aluminium. This suggests that in extending the EU ETS beyond Phase 2 
(2008-12), serious consideration may have to be given to these sectors with 
respect to allocation if key competing nations are not taking equivalent action.  
 
4.2 Options to address competitiveness issues post-2012 
To sustain the EU ETS in the long term as an instrument that helps to (a) 
decarbonise European industry as efficiently as possible, including avoidance 
of allocation-based distortions (b) avoid large transfer payments between 
sectors or between consumers and industrial sectors; and (c) protects the 
competitiveness of European industry in the absence of comprehensive global 
participation is one of daunting complexity. The four main strands of options 
for moving the scheme forward explored in the literature and in general 
policy discussions are summarised here.  
 
Firstly, in theory, combining free-allocation with auction and revenue 
recycling can allow compensation at minimum costs whist raising revenues 
that can be directed towards redistributional purposes. Auctioning 
allowances also has the advantage of minimise distortions in the EU ETS 
(Neuhoff, Keats et al. 2006). Hepburn et al (2006) has argued that greater use 
of auctioning is likely to be a part of solutions for energy intensive sectors and 
there are signs in the NAP 2 debate that allocation is indeed moving in this 
direction.  
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Secondly, output-based allocation (whereby firms are allocated allowances 
according in proportion to production) in theory reduces product prices and 
increases production relative to the grandfathering approach. Because it 
avoids putting constraints on output, this approach is frequently advocated 
by industrialists (Eurofer, 2005; Cembreau 2006). Indeed, studies using sector 
models to quantify impacts (Burtraw, Palmer et al. 2001; Quirion 2003; 
Demailly and Quirion) estimate that compared with allocation by 
grandfathering or auctioning, impact on leakage of production (fall in 
domestic production and rise in imports) to non-EU regions is less under out-
put based allocation, and profits are also less.9 However, CO2 abatement is 
also less under this approach because by linking allocation to output, no CO2 
scarcity rent is created.  
 
Global sectoral agreements covering sectors with high international exposure, 
is discussed widely in the literature (Groenenberg, Phylipsen et al. 2001; 
Thomas, Cameron et al. 2004; Bosi and Ellis 2005; Watson, Newman et al. 
2005; Schmidt, Helm et al. 2006). It represents probably the ‘first best’ solution 
(excepting a comprehensive global agreement on the equivalent use of 
economic instruments) but is obviously a highly ambitious target which 
moreover probably could not be expected to arise for all sectors of concern 
simultaneously.  
 
Finally, the use of border tax adjustments (bta) to protect competitiveness 
whilst maintain the core principle of reflecting full carbon costs has been 
explored in the literature (Biermann and Brohm 2003; Ismer and Neuhoff 
2004; Saddler and Muller et al. 2006; Demailly and Quirion 2006), and recently 
in high level political debates in France and Australia. 
 
4.3 Beyond the sector-level analysis 
So far, analysis using sector-average data has illuminated the need to account 
for cross-sectoral difference in further analysis of competitiveness. However, 
sectoral level analyses can mask significant differences between regions and 
processes within one sector. We now turn to examine more closely the 
potential differences between companies, processes and countries in Europe, 
and how these might affect findings in key sectors.  We focus upon those EU 
ETS sectors - electricity, cement, iron and steel, and pulp and paper - which 
have both high potential cost exposure, and big diversity in terms of the 
carbon intensity or exposure of their operations. 
 
                                                 
9 Quirion (2003) also finds that total production costs (the proxy for employment in European iron and 
steel sector) rises slightly as reductions in production level is more than offset by increased abatement 
measures. 
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5. DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN SECTORS 
5.1 Electricity generation sector 
As noted previously, the ability of the power generation sector to profit from 
the EU ETS despite its energy intensive nature of production is attributed to 
the price inelastic nature of electricity demand, the low trade intensity and 
hence high ability to pass through CO2 opportunity costs to electricity prices. 
In line with theory, empirical studies on cost pass-through such as that by 
Sijm et al. (2006) on the German and Dutch electricity sector observe high pass 
through rates, ranging between 40 and 120% of CO2 costs. 10  
 
However, as partly captured by the range of cost pass through rates estimated 
by Sijm et al (2006), impacts of EU ETS and the ability to profit will vary 
across electricity generators. There are major differences in profit performance 
at the individual firm level due to the differences in technology portfolios 
(and corresponding CO2 intensity of generation), market size and structure, 
institutional structures, regulatory regimes and demand patterns, all of which 
potentially affect pricing strategies hence firm profits.  
 
5.1.1 Diversity of processes and their carbon intensity 
The technology portfolios of firms vary widely in the generation sector (e.g. 
coal, gas, nuclear, hydro and renewables). Each plant for these technologies 
also has different cost structures and carbon intensity. For example, UK 
generating companies diverge enormously in their carbon intensity as shown 
on the left hand side of Figure 4. Although the sector as a whole passes 
through costs to the level expected in an national competitive environment, 
and will benefit from the EU ETS, different companies are affected differently 
due to the changes in merit order induced by the EU ETS. As modeling results 
using the Oxera electricity wholesale market model show (right hand side of 
Figure 4), generators with a relatively high CO2 intensity are likely to become 
less competitive following the scheme’s introduction. Specifically, two 
companies are predicted to see their operating profit decrease even with 90% 
sector pass through, that leads to a 14% increase of wholesale price induced 
by the EU ETS. These represent companies with marginal coal plant at risk of 
losing infra-marginal rent and hence market share. By the same token, other 
companies would increase their operating profits by more than the average. 
                                                 
10 In theory a profit maximising power generator adds the costs of CO2 emission allowances to its other 
marginal (variable) costs when making (short-term) production or trading decisions, hence pass on the 
cost of CO2 allowances onto product prices, even if allowances are allocated to them for fee (Burtraw et 
al., 2002, 2005; Reinaud, 2003). This is because as long as allowances can be sold on the market for a 
positive price, using allowances to cover its emissions carries an opportunity cost. Due to the nature of 
inelastic demand and national markets, the electricity sector has a unique ability to pass on CO2 costs to 
its consumers. 
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Hence the results show a large diversity of earnings impacts attributable to 
the EU ETS. The results are not related only to carbon intensity, due to the 
complexity of the electricity market operation.  
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Figure 4 - Impact of EU ETS on net earnings of different electricity companies in the UK 
Note: Innogy now trades in the UK under the RWE brand. 
Source: Results from OXERA electricity sector dispatch model, Scenario 2 EU ETS 
assumptions with 90% sector cost pass-through.  
 
5.1.2 Diversity across Europe 
As shown in Figure 5, carbon intensity of electricity production varies widely 
across Europe. Peak is dominated by relatively inefficient coal power in 
Greece and on the other extreme are France and Sweden characterised by 
almost no fossil systems. As power sector allocation reflects historic emissions 
under most NAPs, if we assume competitive national markets and a 100% 
cost pass through rate, firms in countries with high intensity of generation are 
expected to profit more from free allowance allocation than those with low 
carbon intensity.11 The reverse would be true would be true if high levels of 
electricity trade tended to levelise prices across the EU.     
                                                 
11 Since less efficient power plants provide peaking and hence set wholesale prices in a pool system, in 
a country where peaking power stations are coal fired, the price rise due to EUA cost pass through are 
correspondingly larger.  
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Figure 5 - Carbon intensity of power production in EU countries (total: fossil and non-
fossil).  
Notes: Peak is dominated by relatively inefficient coal power in Greece. France and Sweden 
characterised by almost no fossil systems. EU 15 average is close to 100tC/kWh (350tCO2/kWh)  
Sources: IISI, OECD 
 
However, such effects will be moderated by regional differences in ownership 
structures, level of concentration in the market and regulatory regime. For 
example, fixed retail prices as in France and contractual arrangements limit 
firms’ ability to reflect CO2 costs in electricity price. Theses differences may 
explain why profit-making differs considerably between power companies in 
different countries. 
  
5.1.3 Mitigation Options  
In the short-run, carbon-intensive generators can reduce their exposure to the 
EU ETS by retrofitting energy efficiency measures or adopting more advanced 
technologies, without switching technology. For example, replacing a coal-
fired steam turbine with pulverised-coal technology can achieve 27% 
emissions reductions and replacing a single cycle gas turbine with CCGT 
brings 36% reductions. Dramatic reductions in the carbon intensity of 
electricity generation necessitate shifting firms’ portfolio of generation assets 
towards lower carbon technologies, such as CCGT, nuclear, renewables, 
biological sequestration and CCS. For example, combined cycle gas turbines 
 17
(CCGT) are on average three times more CO2 efficient than coal/lignite fired 
power plants (350 kg CO2/MWh compared to 900-1,100 kg CO2/MWh). 
 
Resource and technical potentials for mitigation in the power sector are large 
in most Member States, however, economic potentials vary across power 
generators according to technology portfolios and policy environment (e.g. 
level of R&D support and deployment policies).  
 
5.1.4 Free allocation and perverse incentives from  the EU ETS 
As argued by Neuhoff et al. (2006), repeated or new entrant free-allocation in 
the power sector can give perverse incentives. For example, it can encourage 
existing heavy emitters to continue operation of a plant beyond its efficient 
life-time and produce excessive output and emissions in order to increase 
allocation under future allocation plans. These perverse effects distort not 
only static but also dynamic efficiency, counteracting objectives of the overall 
climate policy framework within which the EU ETS exists. Basing free-
allocation on a uniform sectoral benchmark can reduce but not remove 
perverse incentives. As touched upon in section 3.4, increasing the level of 
allocation by auction in NAP2s furthermore addresses concerns about 
windfall profits to the electricity generation sector resulting from the EU ETS.    
5.2 Cement 
Modelling results of the UK cement sector by Smale et al. (2006) estimate that 
EU ETS could have positive impact on profits: 13% and 25% change in 
EBITDA for CO2 price assumptions of €15/tCO2 and €30/tCO2 respectively. 
The results to a large extent reflect the fact that despite having the highest CO2 
emissions per unit of profit out of all EU ETS sectors, cement producers can 
retain price differentials due to high on-land transport costs for cement and 
hence low trade intensity.  
 
Detailed analysis on the EU ETS impact on the European cement industry, 
using a model that takes more detailed account of foreign competition and 
transport costs by Demailly and Quirion (2006) gives additional insight. Whist 
they support the conclusion that cement manufacturers profit from 
grandfathered allowances, they also address the dynamic tension between 
profit maximisation in the short-run and losing market shares to imports in 
the long run. This study explores output based allocation as an alternative 
approach to addressing competitiveness issues, which we come back to 
towards the end of this section. Walker (2006) attempts to test the validity of 
the EU cement sector’s cost pass-through abilities, but finds results to be 
inconclusive.   
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Here we fist examine heterogeneities among cement producers (such as the 
notable high exposure of producers located on costal regions) that 
differentiate competitiveness impact within the sector, which are overlooked 
in Smale et al. (2006). 
 
5.2.1 Diversity of processes and their carbon intensity  
Although cement is considered largely a homogeneous product, carbon 
intensities can vary widely from a low 0.19tC/tonne cement in Western 
Europe, 0.17tC/tonne in Japan, to 0.24tC/tonne in China and the United states 
(Worrell, Price et al. 2001). 
 
By far the largest proportion of energy consumed in cement manufacture 
consists of fuel that is used to heat the kiln used for clinker production. 
Vertical kilns are the oldest and least efficient technology used today, and 
have been replaced by rotary kilns in most of the developed world. Rotary 
kilns technology is further divided into four types – wet, semi-wet, semi-dry 
and dry – the latter being the most modern and least energy-intensive process. 
Compared with plants using a long-wet kiln, dry preheater/ precalciner kiln 
require 45% less energy input.  
 
Given the high sunk costs (cement production plants have operational 
lifetime of 30 years or more), product homogeneity and high degree of 
process-emissions, there is a case for some free allocation in order to moderate 
differentials in the degree of exposure to the EU ETS due to different 
production process. However, perverse incentives can result from different 
approaches to free allocation as discussed below.  
 
5.2.2 Diversity across Europe 
Figure 6 shows kiln technology by region in Europe in the mid 1990s, 
production volume and the corresponding CO2 emissions.  
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Figure 6 Kiln Type (%) and production for cement, by region 
Source: Adapted from Worrell, Price et al. (2001), Humphreys, M..et al. (2002), and CEMBUREAU 
(2000) 
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It is not possible to draw conclusions on relative exposure of cement sector by 
country due to lack of available data on variations in production processes (% 
kiln types) and emission factors by EU country. 
 
In general, however, due to its high transport costs12, cement import is a 
localised issue. Specifically, cement producers located in coastal and boarder 
regions are expected to emerge as a distinct group with high exposure to 
world prices of cement and hence competitiveness impacts from the EU ETS. 
With increased GHG mitigation costs, imports from North Africa are 
expected to increase into Southern Europe. In reality, there exist other trade 
barriers that protect costal European cement manufacturers. For example, EU 
firms may attempt to insulate home markets from foreign competitors by 
dominating available port capacity to restrict importers’ access port facilities.  
 
5.2.3 Mitigation Options 
In the short to medium run, emissions in cement production can be reduced 
by three channels: improving energy efficiency of the process; switching from 
high to low carbon fuels and the use of blended cement (with reduced clinker 
content). 
 
a) Energy efficiency 
Energy efficiency improvements have contributed significantly towards CO2 
reductions in cement production historically. For example, shifts to new 
processes13, conversion from direct to indirect firing, improved recovery from 
coolers, installation of roller presses, optimization of the clinker cooler, 
improvement of preheating efficiency, improved burners as well as process 
control and management systems have been identified as having significant 
impact (Humphreys, M. et al. 2002). The same study estimates potential 
energy efficiency reductions of 11% in the US cement industry corresponding 
to 5% reductions in CO2.  
 
b) Fuel-switching 
Unlike aluminum, over 90% of the energy used in the cement production 
originate from fuels and only 5-10% of the primary energy consumption is 
electricity. Where carbon intensive fuel is used at present, large mitigation 
                                                 
12 For a tonne of cement is sold around €80 at the exit of a plant in France, it costs €10 to transport it by 
road over 100km (Demailly and Quirion, 2006)  
13 In the longer term, shifts in production to modern efficient dry kilns offers opportunities to bring 
down carbon intensity of production significantly. In addition, research has been conducted on the 
reduction of carbon dioxide emissions through carbon dioxide removal, whereby CO2 is separated 
during or after the production process and subsequently stored or disposed of outside the atmosphere. 
However, at this stage of research it is not clear whether this technique can be applied to cement 
production facilities (The Carbon Trust, 2004).   
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opportunities exist in fuel-switching e.g. waste-derived alternative fuels may 
reduce CO2 emissions by 0.1 to 0.5 kg/kg cement produced compared to 
current used production techniques using fossil fuels and at the same time 
diminish the disposal of waste material. However, such efforts may not be 
sufficiently rewarded by the EU ETS, as it achieves emission reductions in 
economic sectors that are not covered by the ETS i.e. waste disposal and 
incineration. 
 
c) Blended cement 
Almost all CO2 emissions embodied in cement originate from clinker 
production, of which 60% is process related to the decarbonisation of lime, 
and 40% are fuel-related (Holcim 2006). Increasing the additives in cement (i.e. 
the use of blended cement) such as blast furnace slags, flyash from coal-fired 
power stations, and volcanic material reduces the amount of clinker needed 
(Josa et al., 2004). Clinker-to-cement ratios in 1994 show a range of 80% in 
Japan and 81% in Western Europe, 88% in the USA and 96% in Korea (Worrell, 
Price et al. 2001). Globally, the average clinker ratio dropped from over 80% in 
1990 to 77% in 2005 (Holcim 2006). However, the availability of suitable 
additives differs between regions. Current applications of blended cement 
varies widely from country to country, being relatively high in Europe and 
low in the U.S. and U.K. 
 
Technical potential of mitigation options vary across production processes, 
and the degree of to which uptake is incentivised is also influenced by A) 
allocation volume and methodology used for CO2 allowance, and  B) other 
existing ‘clean air’ policies in each Member State. 
 
5.2.4 Free allocation and perverse incentives from the EU ETS 
Due to the relative homogeneity of cement products and processes (compared 
to other sectors) and the high proportion of process-emissions that are 
difficult to mitigate with current processes, there is pressure to cushion 
allocation against potential production increase with generous levels of free-
allocation. However, there are risks in these moves away from the full carbon 
price incentives inherent in the current design. For example, ex-post 
allocations based on output per tonne of cement would in practice have to be 
indexed on production of clinker, to prevent companies simply importing this 
most energy-intensive part of the production process (Demailly and Quirion, 
2006). Alternatively, some industry groups have argued for the complete 
omission of process emissions from the ETS as a ‘stop-gap’ measure. Because 
there are major uncertainties about production and the extent to which 
emissions cannot be avoided, eliminating process emissions may make the 
cap more effective (Schleicher, 2006). Such a system – or indeed, ex-post out-
put based allocation – would however remove incentives either for 
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substitution of products (e.g. wood for cement in construction), or for truly 
radical production technology changes.14  
5.3 Iron and Steel 
In general, studies quantifying competitiveness impacts on the iron and steel 
sector (Carbon Trust, 2004; Carbon Trust, 2005; Smale et al., 2006; Demailly 
and Quirion, 2006; and McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006) estimate limited short-run 
impact. Iron and steel is relatively more exposed to international trade 
compared with cement – relative to the 184 Mtons of long and flat products 
produced in the EU25, around 10.8% is imported and 11.25% is exported 
(McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006). However, product differentiation allows for 
price differentiation to a certain degree. 15 In the Smale et al. (2006) study 
modelling cold rolled steel manufacture as a representative homogeneous 
product, when the allowance price is 15€/t CO2, short-run marginal 
production cost increase by 8%, while production output will decrease by 
2.1%. It also estimates that steel manufacturers are able to pass on 65% of their 
marginal cost increases to consumers.  
 
Results for the steel sector are highly scenario-dependent, however, and 
indeed, the iron and steel industry is characterised by complexities on many 
dimensions which likely differentiate competitiveness impacts within the 
sector: A) multiple products (substitution possibilities and price structures?); 
B) multiple processes (varied cost structures and abatement opportunities); C) 
varying levels of price elasticity of demand for imports/exports; D) large firms 
and imperfect competition in the sector16.   
  
5.3.1 Diversity of products, processes and their carbon intensity  
i) Product differentiation 
Unlike cement, steel is not a homogeneous product; steel grades and quality 
vary to satisfy a wide range of applications including construction, 
automotive, packaging, appliances, and manufacturing industries. These 
varying products and grades are manufactured using different steelmaking 
pathways between the integrated process (BOF), and the alternative 
steelmaking process utilising the electric arc furnace (EAF). To some extent, 
                                                 
14 In the cement sector, a possible example might be the ‘carbonsafe’ proposals for producing cement 
through catalytic processes, with the carbon for the cement absorbed from the atmosphere rather 
through crushing of rocks (http://www.tececo.com/projects.carbonsafe.php).  If feasible, this would 
ultimately turn cement production from being one of the biggest sources of CO2 emissions into being 
one of the biggest ‘sinks’. Allocation approaches that protect the cement sector from the carbon intensity 
of clinker production and the associated process emissions, however, would largely remove the 
incentive for the industry to explore or invest in such processes.  
15 The level of international competition and product homogeneity is considerably greater for the 
manufacture of hot rolled steel manufacture, compared with cold rolled steel.  
16 The top ten companies account for 28% of total world steel production (IISI, 2005).  
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product differentiation in the steel sector provides steel firms in the EU with 
profits despite a high cost base (World Steel Dynamics, 2006). However, 
evidence of considerable trade flow within the EU and rising imports from 
China suggests continuing product differentiation and its ability to sustain 
price differentials in the long run is highly uncertain. The industry in general 
is not built around niche markets.  
 
ii) Process differentiation  
Two process routes are used for iron and steel production. In the primary or 
BOF route, CO2 is emitted through a series of processes to produce hot metal 
(during the conversion of coal to coke or in blast furnaces). Similar to process 
emissions in cement production, CO2 is also a by-product of chemical 
reactions throughout the iron making process, including the reduction of iron 
ore to iron, reduction of materials from coke input, and limestone reduction 
for sulphur removal in the molten iron17.  
 
The secondary route of producing steel involves melting scrap metal using 
electrodes in an electric arc furnace (EAF). The EAF route uses only 30-40% of 
energy used in the primary route but almost all energy input is sourced from 
electricity, hence CO2 emissions is a function of source of electricity.18 To a 
large extent, the process determines the final product e.g. stainless steel is 
produced using EAF.  
 
As allocation under existing NAPs account only for direct CO2 emissions of 
iron and steel production, whereas integrated plants receive free allocation for 
emissions generated from the production of coke, molten iron, and crude steel, 
EAF plants do not receive allowances for indirect energy inputs. Basing 
allocation on historic emission therefore protects the carbon intensive steel 
producers, whist EAF steel production remains similarly exposed to 
competitiveness impacts along with downstream industries like Aluminium, 
due to its high vulnerability to indirect impact of increased electricity prices. 
The study by McKinsey and Ecofys (2006) addresses the differentiation 
between BOF and EAF in terms of both cost pass thorough ability and relative 
reliance on direct and indirect energy inputs. 
 
5.3.2 Diversity across Europe 
                                                 
17 On average, a tonne of steel produced using BF consumes around 400kg of coke and around 300kWh 
electricity. 
18 On average, a tonne of steel produced using the integrated route in the OECD has an emission factor 
of 2.2 t CO2/t, of which fossil fuels accounts for 2.1 t CO2/t and electricity accounts for only 0.1 t CO22/t. 
In contrast,  the emission factor for steel produced using the EAF process is 0.5  t CO2/t, of which 
electricity accounts for 0.3 t CO2/t (Watson et al, 2005).  
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The product mix and hence production routes are largely driven by the 
economics of input materials for production. This explains to a large extent, 
the international variation in the ratio between the primary and secondary 
production routes, and the corresponding rate of CO2 tonnage emitted per 
unit of steel output as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Comparison of Carbon Dioxide Generation and Method of Steel Production in 2003 
Source: Data from The Carbon Trust based on IISI, OECD. 
 
Integrated steelmaking pathways are dependent on availability of coal and 
iron ore, while the secondary route relies heavily on scrap steel availability. 
High sunk costs and the volatility of world scrap supply and prices also 
constrain the substitutability of the two production processes.   
 
5.3.3 Mitigation options 
Iron and steel is one of the most energy intensive manufacturing sectors and 
accounts for an estimated 5.2% of total global GHG emissions (Watson, 
Newman et al. 2005). The production processes involves a series of batch 
processes, generating various fuel and heat by-products throughout the 
process. There are a wide variety energy retrofit and other efficiency I 
mproving options including by-product heat, energy and process gas 
recovery, reducing loss of heat, process integration, and efficient design of 
furnaces. In addition, fuel-switching in integrated steel plants (e.g. instead of 
coke, Direct Reduced Iron technology utilises chemical reactions and natural 
gas to produce molten iron) can significantly reduce emissions.  
 
Mitigation potentials in the industry have been estimated by several authors. 
In an examination of 47 energy efficiency improvements in the US iron and 
steel sector, Worrell et al (2001) found a technical potential of 24% efficiency 
improvements out to 2010, and a economic potential of 18% using a 30% 
discount rate. De Beer et al (2001), using a discount rate of 4% estimate the 
cost-effective potential in EU-15 out to 2010 to be 10.2% (18 Mt CO2/yr) 
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compared with baseline emissions. In addition, technical potentials of around 
15 Mt CO2/yr for eight energy saving technologies in 2030 in Western Europe 
are estimated by Tanaka et al (2006) using the Monte Carlo approach. 
Adopting such technologies offer steel makers the opportunity to reduce 
exposure to EU ETS competitiveness impacts. 
 
However, the economic potential for energy efficiency improvements varies 
widely across individual plants, depending on plant configurations and on 
local markets for fuels, heat and electricity (Watson, Newman et al. 2005).  
 
The European iron and steel sector, in partnership with international steel 
producers, suppliers and academics, is also addressing post-Kyoto issues 
through the €44m, partly EC-funded, Ultra Low CO2 Steelmaking (ULCOS) 
Initiative. This multi-phased project focuses on developing technological 
innovations for the integrated method of steel production including smelting 
reduction processes that will eliminate the requirement of coke, which is an 
energy-intensive product that produces CO2 in the coke-making and iron-
making processes. Another project within this initiative is research into CO2 
capture and storage; this particular project is seen as an essential method for 
ULCOS to meet its CO2 reduction targets (House of Commons Select 
Committee 2005). Such RD&D efforts by OECD steelmakers, including EU 
manufacturers, are essential in order to develop sustainable innovations for 
steel production based on finite resources and the global competitive market 
of the iron and steel sector. 
 
5.3.4 Free allocation and perverse incentives from the EU ETS  
As mentioned above, under existing NAPs that index allocation to historic 
emissions rewards high emitters (i.e. integrated steel mills) with larger 
allowances, whilst the lower CO2-emitting EAF process receives less. 
Furthermore, a study by Entec and NERA Economic Consulting (2005) has 
noted perverse incentives resulting from allocation methods: because 
downstream operations such as cold rolling and annealing are unaccounted 
for in the current scheme, there is an incentive to ‘leak’ gases produced from 
upstream operations such as blast furnaces and from basic oxygen 
steelmaking and utilised for its energy content in these downstream 
operations. However, these issues have since been addressed according to 
subsequent publications (DTI, 2005).  
 
Like cement, some industry groups have put forward for output-based 
allocation scheme based upon cost pass-through abilities and value at stake as 
a proportion of sector profit. This, as supported by modelling studies 
quantifying impacts on the steel sector (Burtraw, Palmer et al. 2001; Quirion 
2003) provides incentives for firms to maintain production levels and hence 
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reduces leakage. However, these models consistently estimate that compared 
with allocation by grandfathering of auctioning, the iron and steel sector 
profits less with output-based allocation. Because no CO2 scarcity rent is 
created, CO2 costs are not internalised into decision-making, and are not 
reflected in product prices. This means that there is less incentive for 
intermediate and final consumers to switch to less polluting products. If 
allocation is generous and output increases, then steel prices will fall.  
 
As Figure 3 shows, large volumes of iron and steel products are traded within 
the EU, hence it is important that allocation methodology is harmonised 
across MS.  
 
5.4 Pulp and paper 
Although analysis on the UK newsprint production in (Smale, M. et al. 2006) 
estimates the EU ETS cause very small impact, this result may not be 
applicable sector and EU wide for the following reasons: newsprint represents 
only a small proportion of production in the sector, its raw material basis and 
production technologies are not representative of the whole EU, and the P&P 
industry in the UK is extremely small relative to Scandinavian or central 
European countries. Nonetheless, two essential cross-cutting features of P&P 
are reflected in the results. Firstly, with high levels of use of on-site Combined 
Heat and Power (CHP) generation based on waste as fuel, production costs is 
relatively less exposed to increased electricity prices. At the same time, the 
market for paper and pulp is highly globalised, hence producers have limited 
opportunity to pass on costs to product prices. 
 
5.4.1 Diversity of product, processes and carbon intensity  
Comparing the energy efficiency and CO2 factors of pulp and paper plants 
internationally is difficult as product mixes and energy supplies differ 
dramatically between plants and countries (Siitonen and Ahtila 2002). The 
sector is characterised by: multiple production technologies (mechanical and 
chemical pulping); different product types (pulp, newsprint, fine papers, 
packaging, and sanitary and household); multiple raw materials (wood and 
recycled fibre); and energy as a side product in some of the production 
technologies (chemical pulping produce waste liquor, and heat recovery with 
mechanical pulping)(Phylipsen, Blok et al. 1998). 
 
Whereas some production processes are self-sufficient of energy supply 
(chemical pulping) and might even produce surplus, others (mechanical 
pulping, fine paper when not integrated with chemical pulping) require 
significant external supply of energy, especially electricity. Recycled fibre 
based paper production is much less energy intensive process than wood 
based paper production (Siitonen and Ahtila 2002). Table 2 summarises the 
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differences in carbon intensity between pulp and paper production 
technologies. 
 
Industry Indirect CO2 
emissions 
Direct CO2 
emissions 
Total CO2 
emissions 
Chemical pulp 0.07 0.04 0.12 
Chemical P&P 0.62 0.00 0.62 
Mechanical P&P 1.03 0.00 1.03 
Thermo-mech.P&P 0.12 0.02 0.14 
Recovered fibre P&P 0.27 0.34 0.61 
Table 2 Carbon intensity in pulp and paper production, tons of CO2 per ton of 
pulp/paper produced. 
Source: McKinsey and Ecofys (2006), p.32. 
 
5.4.2 Diversity across Europe 
Europe is divided into countries where wood material is available and allows 
large scale production (Scandinavia) and where most paper is produced by 
recycled fibre or imported pulp (rest of Europe). As shown in Figure 8, 
Scandinavian countries produce large volumes of high quality products for 
export (using highly energy efficient processes) while Central Europe has 
smaller and less efficient facilities for local consumption. In addition to 
Scandinavia, Germany is a significant paper producer in Central Europe 
(Commission 2001).  
 
Pulp & Paper Sector
*Sum of paper and market pulp production
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Figure 8 - Pulp and Paper production of selected EU countries in 2002 
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Source: adapted from CEPI Annual Statistics 2002 & Finnish Forestries Industries 
federation. 
 
Exposure to import is unevenly divided between plants and EU countries as 
some products are produced for domestic or local markets while others are 
mainly exported. The largest producers, namely Finland and Sweden, export 
a significant share, almost 1/3 of total production outside the EU, while the 
EU remains the most important market (Swedish Forest Industries Federation 
2005). Competitiveness impacts from EU ETS concerns in the pulp and paper 
sector therefore affect Scandinavia more than rest of Europe, as the share of 
the sector of GDP is high (Kemppi, Honkatukia et al. 2002).   
 
5.4.3 Mitigation Options 
There are three main avenues for reducing CO2 emissions in the sector: 
1) Saving energy by new modes of operation: improvements of skills and 
motivation of personnel; energy audits; process integration; monitoring 
and control; and modern financing mechanisms of energy conservation 
such as Energy Saving Companies. 
2) New technology: Introduction of more energy efficient technologies; 
and electrical devices with low energy consumption (Siitonen and 
Ahtila 2002). Also gasification of fuels, especially bio fuels, provides 
emission reductions. 
3) Fuel switching can be an importance source of emission reductions. 
Practical examples include further introduction of CHP and increasing 
energy sourced from renewable energy sources.  
 
Many of these grouped potentials, particularly those involving fuel switching 
and increasing CHP capacity, have already been used in Scandinavia, but 
large potentials remain in Central Europe. The fact that own CHP capacity 
reduces the exposure to electricity price rises (The Carbon Trust 2004) has also 
been largely recognised. In Scandinavia, CHP is already common amongst 
pulp producers as a result of the supply of waste liquor that can be used as a 
fuel. Such bio fuels are carbon neutral that can allow some of the received 
allocation to be sold in the EU ETS.  
 
Most of the pulp and paper firms in Finland own significant shares of 
electricity producing companies which contributes to the lower electricity 
prices for them (Siitonen and Ahtila 2002; Korppoo unpublished). Similarly, 
large industrial energy users may be able to negotiate a lower electricity price 
based on long-term contracts with low carbon producers receiving windfall 
profits as their production costs have not increased in line with electricity 
prices (The Carbon Trust 2004).  
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The instability of carbon price contributes to the difficulty of investment 
planning while the energy intensity of the sector makes the sector vulnerable 
to the influence of the EU ETS. Operating outside the EU and self-sufficiency 
of energy can protect the sector from the negative impacts of the EU ETS. One 
additional concern is the influence of carbon pricing to the availability of 
wood raw material for pulp production as carbon costs may encourage using 
the carbon neutral wood as a fuel rather than as raw material of paper 
(McKinsey and Ecofys, p.33; CEPI 2003).  
 
5.4.4 Free allocation and perverse incentives from the EU ETS  
The pulp and paper market is global (Kemppi, Honkatukia et al. 2002; CEPI 
2003) and pricing is competitive due to fairly low concentration of the sector 
(McKinsey and Ecofys 2006, p.33) which increases the sensitivity of the sector 
to competition from outside the EU where carbon is not priced. Consequently, 
European pulp and paper producers have limited ability to pass through CO2 
prices to product prices, however, this varies between products. According to 
the same study, 50% of the expected increased costs of chemical pulp 
production can be passed on to the customer while the respective figure for 
paper is 0-20%, and 0-0.7% for recovered pulp. 
 
The EU ETS is expected to influence the division of markets between pulp 
and paper producers inside and outside the EU as the carbon cost, especially 
those linked to increasing electricity prices, is not added to prices outside the 
EU (McKinsey and Ecofys 2006, p.33; CEPI 2003). This competitive advantage 
for producers from outside the EU, especially from the US, worries EU 
producers.  
 
McKinsey and Ecofys (2006, p. 36) has estimated that the short and mid-term 
effect of the EU ETS on competitiveness (assuming 95% free allocation of 
allowances) is reflected as the following net cost increases: 0% for chemical 
market pulp, 1.2-1.9% for recovered fibre, 0.6-1.1% for paper produced of 
chemical pulp, 3.1-4.2% for paper produced of mechanical pulp and 4.7-6.2% 
for paper produced of thermo-mechanical pulp. These figures illustrate the 
uneven influence of the EU ETS on different pulp and paper production 
technologies. 
 
Complexity of the sector makes the competitiveness issues, and incentive 
issues difficult to conceptualise. For instance, the UK newsprint producers 
argue that integrated producers of pulp and paper (mainly in Scandinavia) 
have a competitive advantage as they are able to use the waste stream of their 
pulp production as a carbon neutral source of energy (The Carbon Trust 2004). 
It is true that for instance Finnish pulp and paper industry is self-sufficient of 
heat, and produces some 40% of its electricity demand (Siitonen and Ahtila 
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2002). But as the scale of production is much larger in Scandinavia than in the 
UK, the dramatically less energy intensive process based on recycled fibre 
cannot be used as the main supply of raw material which is possible in the 
smaller scale production in Central Europe. Consequently, the additional cost 
of carbon has much smaller impact on producers using recycled fibre in 
Central Europe. 
 
Business actors around Europe have argued that early action, which refers to 
investments in advanced low carbon technologies such as efficient production 
processes, CHP and bio fuels, has not been recognised in the national 
allocation of emitting rights (Kylä-Harakka-Ruonala 2004; The Carbon Trust 
2004). Even withholding from updating technology in order to increase the 
EU ETS allocation was suggested as means to protect business from carbon 
costs by one Finnish pulp and paper producer. It seems that NAPs address 
this problem different ways which may influence competitiveness of 
companies inside the EU. However, such early action has certainly protected 
the sector from the EU ETS as the plants supplied by renewable energy 
sources require no emitting rights, and any allocation under EU ETS would 
provide an additional source of revenues. However, competitiveness between 
EU and non-EU producers is more relevant than the influence of National 
Allocation Plans to the competitiveness between EU countries. 
 
Moreover, as there is competition between EU producers, it is important that 
the method of national allocation is similar in all member states (The Carbon 
Trust 2004).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has summarised cross-cutting factors that differentiate impacts of 
the EU ETS on profitability and market share, drawing upon the basic insights 
derived from modelling studies of individual sectors (Smale et al. 2006); that 
most sectors participating in the EU ETS and in particular the power 
generation sector will profit under the current structure out to 2012, but for 
trade sectors, this comes at the cost of a modest loss of market share.  
 
However, conclusions from aggregated analysis mask differences in exposure 
experienced on an individual firm or sectoral level. Through examining 
sample sectors, this paper sheds light on the underlying factors that 
differentiate impacts.   
 
First, to translate the general principles of cross-sectoral differentiation into 
quantitative insights, we develop and apply indices to a wide range of sectors. 
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The indices developed with reference to 2004 UK data in Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate that sectors vary widely in their: 
• potential net value at stake if sectors receive 0% to 100% free 
allocation, due to differences in sector EU ETS costs relative to 
sector value-added;  
• ability to apply marginal pricing (pass thorough EUA costs to 
product prices) because of varying exposure to international trade; 
• exposure to indirect costs through electricity price impacts only. 
 
Under the existing scheme where EU ETS sectors receive free allocation 
similar to BAU levels and no sectors receive compensation for indirect 
electricity price rise impacts, Non-ferrous metals (principally Aluminium) 
stand out for their high exposure, not only in potential value-at-stake terms 
but also in their exposure. Due to their relatively high exposure to indirect 
electricity impacts, the potential for exposure is also high for the iron and steel 
sector if the scheme moves towards zero free allocation. However, if sectors 
receive 100% free allocation, potential net value at stake is low - below 3% - 
for all sectors except Aluminium. 
 
A closer look into the EU ETS sectors in Section 5 has shown differentiated 
competitive impacts within sectors across production processes and across 
regions. Across processes, both the differences in the degree of reliance on 
electricity input from the grid as well as the range and scope of mitigation 
options are in some cases considerable. Furthermore, perverse incentives that 
result from methods of free allocation have been identified in most EU ETS 
sectors.  
 
To secure efficient mitigation investments by heavy industry requires at least 
the continuation and basic principles of the EU ETS post-2012. Providing that 
this is quickly clarified, the period 2008-12 can, under the current terms of the 
EU ETS, assist the participating sectors to build up experience and financial 
reserves that can assist them with longer term technology-related investments, 
and diversification, providing the incentives are in place for them to peruse 
this. However to strengthen the scheme beyond 2012, significant changes to 
allocation methodology will be required, taking account of differentiated 
impacts outlined in this paper. 
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